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Abstract 
 
Contract scholarship has given little attention to the production process for 
contracts. The usual assumption is that the parties will construct the contract ex 
nihilo, choosing all the terms so that they will maximize the surplus from the 
contract. In fact, parties draft most contracts by slightly modifying the terms of 
contracts that they have used in the past, or that other parties have used in related 
transactions. A small literature on boilerplate recognizes this phenomenon, but little 
empirical work examines the process. This Article provides an empirical analysis by 
drawing on a data set of sovereign bonds. We show that exogenous factors are key 
determinants in the evolution of these contracts. We find an evolutionary pattern 
that roughly separates into three stages. Stage one where a particular standard form 
dominates; stage two where there are external shocks and marginal players 
experiment with deviations from the standard form; and stage three where a new 
standard emerges. The pattern confirms roughly to the S curve commonly described 
in the product innovation literature. We also find that more marginal law firms are 
likely to be leaders in innovation at early stages of the innovation cycle but that 
dominant law firms are the leaders at later stages.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The literature on the evolution or production of contracts is sparse. 
Contracts, and the provisions in them, are generally conceptualized as arising as a 
function of the needs of the specific transaction at hand. Parties draft contracts ex 
nihilo, the way that an author might write an original work. Reality is different. 
Lawyers typically produce new contracts by modifying existing templates, including 
older contracts or forms that have been developed by trade associations. They are 
more like inventors than authors: they take existing products and try to improve 
them so that they meet the needs at hand. As a result, contract production is path 
dependent, giving rise to the phenomenon of boilerplate.1 Boilerplate has an odd 
dual quality: it is thought to be necessary (which is why it is left in the contract) but 
parties often do not know why it is important. Judicial opinions reflect this 
confusion, with many courts expressing skepticism about boilerplate even while 
they frequently enforce it.2  
 
Boilerplate is sticky but not static. We know that boilerplate changes, as do 
form contracts generally. But we know little about how these contracts change. In a 
prior article, we examined the evolution of sovereign debt contracts over a roughly 
fifty-year period.3 Over a period that long, we found that contract provisions did 
change and often did so meaningfully; these were not just cases of contract language 
being modified around the margins; entirely new provisions showed up and old 
provisions disappeared. However, those changes did not occur in a manner that 
resembled the conventional model of deal-to-deal tailoring of contract provisions. 
Contracts generally changed on an industry-wide basis, in response to major events, 
such as global financial crises. For example, after the Latin American debt crisis in 
the early 1980s, sovereigns adopted new terms in their sovereign bond contracts 
including waivers of sovereign immunity, consent to enforcement, consent to 
jurisdiction, governing law, agent for service of process, and cross default 
provisions. Individualized change or tailoring—that is, where terms used by one 
issuer were not also used by the other issuers—was less prevalent, but not absent. 
Individualized change also tended to show up in response to shocks or significant 
events, but the events in question were significant for particular actors and not the 
                                                        
1 For a discussion of the literature on contract stickiness, see ROBERT SCOTT & MITU GULATI, THE THREE 
AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming, U. 
Chicago Press 2013).  
2 Compare Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (NJ 1960) (refusing to enforce boilerplate 
clause), and ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447(7th Cir 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (making the point 
that boilerplate can be useful). 
3 Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 
__ J. LEGAL ANALYSIS __(2012), available at  
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/05/31/jla.las004.full.. 
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market as a whole – in the case of sovereign debtors, these were individual defaults 
rather than regional or global crises. 
 
In this article, we extend our prior research to analyze the internal dynamics 
of these periods of clustered change. We assess how boilerplate terms shift to a new 
standard.  
 
The industry we use in our analysis is the sovereign bond market for foreign-
law governed bonds. These are the bonds typically purchased by cross border 
investors and are typically governed by either the laws of New York or England. The 
parties in this market tend to be sophisticated (states, banks, mutual funds, pension 
fund, hedge funds, etc.). Regulation is sparse–after all, the key actors are the states 
themselves. And the basic economic problem in the transaction has remained the 
same over centuries. States borrow money from foreign investors. But it is hard to 
force the states to pay the money back if the states decide that they would rather 
not. States nonetheless have an economic incentive to give investors some 
confidence in getting repaid in order to get the investors to lend to the states in the 
first place. The stability of the basic economic transaction over time is important 
because it enables us to test our evolutionary model over a long period of time.  
 
 We focus on a particular shift in the boilerplate sovereign bond contract for 
those issuances governed under New York law: the shift toward collective action 
clauses (or CACs) from unanimity action clauses (or UACs) governing changes to 
payment related terms. The shift to CACs was a watershed event in the history of 
sovereign bond covenants.4 It significantly increased the ability of bondholders and 
issuers to engage in debt restructurings.5 Our interest is not only with how and 
when New York-law governed contracts shifted from UACs to CACs for payment 
terms but also the process of change for a number of other CAC-related terms, 
including the vote threshold for non-payment terms as well as disenfranchisement, 
mandatory meeting, and aggregation clauses (we explain these later). Together 
particular combinations of these terms form the “model” that applies in any 
                                                        
4 There is now a large literature discussing this debate and the eventual shift to CACs in the New York 
market. See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS 100(2007); Randal Quarles, Herding Cats: 
Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt--The Genesis of the Project to Change Market Practice in 
2001 to 2003, 73 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 29 (2010); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework 
to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 295 (2005); David Skeel, Can Majority Voting 
Provisions Do it All? 52 EMORY L. J. 417 (2003).  
5 On the impact of these CACs, see Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the 
Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis (March 2012 draft; available on ssrn.com). The question of exactly 
how important these CACs have been is a matter of continuing debate, but the basic point that a bond 
with a unanimity requirement to alter payment terms is harder to restructure than one with a 
supermajority one is not at issue. Cf. FREDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS 
AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES (2006). 
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particular sovereign bond contact. In discussing the evolution of this model, we will 
occasionally describe innovations as “major” and “minor”. Consistent with the policy 
debates over CACs, we call the shift away from unanimity as the “major” shift and 
the changes in other terms as “minor” shifts.  
 
 Shocks to the sovereign debt market, in the form of Mexico’s crisis in 1995, 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98, and Argentina’s default in 2001, were 
important triggers for the changes in the contract model. We report on the types of 
contract innovations that took place with the start of these shocks and the market 
participants associated with these changes. Importantly, a shift in the CAC model as 
the new standard did not occur overnight. Instead, there was a period of time after 
Mexico’s crisis in 1995 through Argentina’s default in 2001 during which the use of 
CACs was infrequent and only associated with more marginal market participants.  
 
 After this initial period, a tipping point occurred—driven by the cumulative 
effect of the default shocks as well as vocal public sector pressure—at which point 
top market participants changed from supporting the old standard to competing 
actively with one another to generate the new standard. At this tipping point, the 
usage of the old standard dropped rapidly and the incidence of the new CACs 
increased dramatically—giving an X pattern at the point where their usage 
percentages in the market crossed. We report evidence that once this tipping 
point—the X point—is reached, subsequent CAC innovations, largely involving the 
CAC-related terms such as the aggregation clause, are driven by the top market 
participants competing to control the eventual new CAC-standard. This competition 
eventually led to a new standard, Mexico’s version of the CAC first used in 2003 and 
a gradual slowing of adoption of the CAC model in the market as CACs saturated the 
market. This slow initial experimentation, then rapid acceleration of adoption, 
followed lastly by a slowing adoption in the market as the CAC became dominant, 
tracks the classic S adoption curve found in the product innovation literature. 
 
 In Part II, we survey the background literature on contract innovation. We 
draw from this literature to set up our hypotheses regarding the process of 
boilerplate contract change. Part III describes our sovereign bond dataset, including 
the key CAC clauses, and the shocks to the sovereign bond market during the time 
period of our dataset that we use in our empirical tests. These shocks primarily hit 
issuers using New York-law governed bonds, and that was the market segment from 
which the impetus for innovation arose. Part IV presents evidence from the New 
York-law governed portion of our sovereign bond dataset on the process of contract 
change. Part V extends our analysis to parallel contractual change that occurred in 
the CACs within the English-law-governed sovereign bond market. We use 
NYU Draft: 6/26/12 
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differences in how contract innovation occurred in this separate market to 
illuminate what distinguishes the initial stages of contract innovation from later 
stages of new contract standardization. In particular, the presence of external calls 
for change (in our case from the public sector) is an important factor in determining 
when top market participants shift from defending the existing standard to 
competing to generate the new standard. 
 
II.  Background: The Innovation to Standardization Cycle 
 
The idea of conceptualizing standard-form contracts as products is not a new 
one.6 However, that conceptualization has not been extended into asking–as is 
frequently done in the commercial product literature–how the cycle of innovation to 
market dominance occurs for contract terms. We call this the innovation-to-
standardization cycle because entering the standard-form or boilerplate is the 
equivalent of market dominance.  
 
While the whole cycle has not been examined, portions of it have been 
studied. For example, scholars have examined the question of what factors induce 
shifts in the boilerplate, using models built on assumptions about strong network 
effects. Network effects, when added to the fact that returns from innovation in 
contract are difficult to capture (the difficulty in patenting the innovation combined 
with the ease of copying it), results in contract stickiness.7 When contract parties 
abandon a standard and adopt a new form contract, they take the risk that courts 
will interpret their terms in an unpredictable way. At the same time, if their new 
form works well and is consistently interpreted by courts, then other parties can 
imitate it. Thus, the earlier adopters confer a positive externality while internalizing 
all the risk. Accordingly, one expects that firms will undersupply innovation of 
boilerplate or form contracts. 
 
Using a model of network effects and stickiness in contract change, Kahan 
and Klausner predicted, and found, that high-volume intermediaries would be 
associated with changes in boilerplate provisions in corporate bond contracts.8 
Research by two of us on sovereign debt contracts found roughly similar high-
                                                        
6 E.g., Mark Suchman, Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L. & SOCIETY REV. 91 (2003); John Burke, Contract 
as Commodity: A Non Fiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS J. 285 (1999-2000); Hank T. Greely, 
Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of the Contract, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 133 (1989).  
7 For an overview of the legal literature, see Clayton P. Gillette, Standard Form Contracts (2009 draft), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/181/. 
8 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting’ (or ‘The 
Economics of Boilerplate’), 83 VA. L. REV.713 (1997). 
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volume intermediaries as being key change agents (the change agents in question 
were different in the two settings; but the basic idea was the same).9 The theory is 
that in markets with strong network effects, there are costs to deviating from the 
boilerplate. Higher-volume intermediaries such as investment bankers or law firms 
are more willing to change boilerplate language than their lower-volume 
competitors, because the high-volume intermediaries have the scale to ensure the 
adoption of a new standard while also garnering the benefits of moving to an 
improved product design, at least in the short term. Being at the forefront of 
innovation potentially also helps confirm the status of these high-volume 
intermediaries as market leaders.10 More generally, scholars studying financial 
product innovation have found that strong network effects can give rise to big first-
mover advantages to innovations by large investment banks.11  
 
However, recent research suggests that deviations from the boilerplate or 
standard form occur more often than the strong network effects model might 
predict.12 In the context of boilerplate financial contracts among sophisticated 
parties, research has found that contract innovations arise not only from high-
volume intermediaries but also from marginal players.13 The reason may be that 
marginal players believe that they can best compete with established players by 
innovating, while established players have no reason to take the risk of negative 
outcomes from contractual innovation if they can rely on returning customers or 
their reputation for satisfactory performance of legal work. Indeed, it is often 
thought in the context of production that small firms are more innovative than large 
                                                        
9 Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Debt Contracts, 53 EMORY L. J. 929 (2004). 
10 E.g., Damon J. Phillips & Ezra W. Zuckerman, Middle-Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and 
Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets 107 Amer. J. Soc. 379 (2001) (suggesting that innovation 
typically arises from either those at the top of the status hierarchy, seeking to confirm that status, or 
those at the bottom, seeking to break into the market). 
11  Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (George M. 
Constantinides ed. 2003); more generally, see W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies 
of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 116 (2004). 
12 The studies discussed in the text examined financial contracts with sophisticated lawyers on both 
sides. Mass-produced take-it-or-leave-it consumer contracts, where only one side has counsel, are a 
different kettle of fish. Examining this other context, Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor, found more 
frequent changes in contract language than the prior studies. Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor also found 
that innovations were more likely to emanate from younger, larger, and faster growing firms. 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer 
Standard-Form Contracts, __ NYU L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2012). 
13 Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 101 (2009); Mark C. Weidemaier, 
Reforming Sovereign Lending Practices: Modern Initiatives in Historical Context (UNCTAD Working 
Paper 2012); Mark C. Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts and the Hunt 
for Pari Passu, __ L. & SOC. INQUIRY __ (2012), available at  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01313.x/abstract; Scott & Gulati, 
supra note 1. 
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firms. In any event, the contractual innovations by marginal players did not always 
receive high levels of attention in the literature, perhaps because the innovations in 
question did not receive widespread adoption.14  
 
To reconcile these two lines of research, one might hypothesize that there 
are two distinct periods to the standardization process. During the initial period 
there are innovations or deviations from the standard form, but they do not 
necessarily garner widespread adoption. These innovations can come from a wide 
range of parties. We conjecture that market participants at the margins, without a 
vested interest in maintaining the existing standard, will be the most likely to 
promote innovation in the initial period. The dominant players, being the primary 
users of, and experts in, the existing standard, will be less likely to innovate in this 
first period. The next period, where a particular innovation becomes widely adopted 
is where high-volume or high-status intermediaries play a key role in promulgating 
the innovation. Approval of an innovation by official actors—in the sovereign debt 
context, a key industry group or the IMF may be such actors—might also have an 
impact on whether the innovation gained wide adoption.15  
 
To summarize, the literature suggests two things. First, deviations away from 
the boilerplate can and do occur. But early versions of these innovations often 
receive little notice; it can be decades before an innovation gets picked up for wider 
adoption. Second, deviations from the standard-form do occasionally displace the 
old boilerplate and those displacements frequently correlate with the adoption of 
the deviation by high-volume players in a market.  
  
Accordingly, using our data of sovereign bond contracts, we first hypothesize 
that prior to a shock, the existing boilerplate standard will dominate with little to no 
innovation. Standards have inertia and are costly to change. Without any shock to 
move even marginal market participants away from the standard, we expect the 
pre-existing standard to prevail in the market. We refer to this as “stage one”. 
Second, once shocks commence, we predict a period of experimentation by more 
marginal players in the market (referred to as “stage two”). Third, with enough 
shocks and possibly external pressure, we predict that the shift to a new standard 
will accelerate, particularly once a shift to a new standard is viewed as likely in the 
marketplace, and then eventually slow as the new standard saturates the market 
                                                        
14 See Mark Gugiatti & Anthony J. Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds 
of Sovereign Issuers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815 (2004); Ann Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the 
Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003, 4 CAPITAL MKTS. L. J. 85 (2009). 
15 Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. Q. 1627 
(2006). 
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(referred to as “stage three”). We predict that top market participants that derive 
value from the specific contract language (such as attorneys selling their services in 
part as contractual experts) will take the lead in innovation once it is clear that the 
market will shift away from the old standard.  
 
III.  The Dataset: Shocks and Clauses 
 
We use a dataset covering roughly twenty years of sovereign bond issuances. 
This is the era of the modern cross-border sovereign bond markets. Although there 
were a small number of sovereign bond issuances done prior to 1990, much of the 
lending in the pre-1990 period was in the form of syndicated loans. The bond 
market began growing significantly, in the wake of the Latin American Debt crisis of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.16 Our dataset includes bonds available on the 
Thomson One Banker database issued between January 1, 1990 and July 1, 2011 
and contains over 700 separate bond issues by roughly 75 sovereigns.  
 
The Thomson One Banker database has one of the largest collections of 
contemporary sovereign bonds. Our data on contract terms is based on the 
summary of terms provided in the offering documents (prospectuses, prospectus 
supplements and offering circulars) mentioned available on the databases 
mentioned above. While we have only a small subset of the actual contracts (roughly 
30), we have no reason to think that the offering documents contain inaccurate 
descriptions of the underlying contract provisions. Further, our comparisons of the 
actual contracts with the disclosures in the offering documents provided an exact 
match on the provisions we examined. 
 
For our analysis of the evolutionary process for contract terms, we take as 
our starting point a period of relative calm in the international lending markets, the 
early 1990s. This is a period during which both the New York-law and English-law 
market had developed rather stable, albeit different, boilerplate contracts that 
evolved out of the experiences with the Latin American debt crisis. From that period 
of stability, we trace changes in contract terms as they occur before and after 
subsequent shocks to the sovereign market. We define “shocks” as events that, 
according to press accounts and policy discussions at the time, caused key actors to 
question the efficacy of the prevailing boilerplate. The shocks that we discuss have 
been extensively discussed in the substantial literature relating to CACs.17  
                                                        
16 On the shift from syndicated loans to bonds, see Graciela Kaminsky, Crises and Sudden Stops: 
Evidence From the International Bond and Syndicated-Loan Market, Bank of Japan Working Paper 
2008-E-10, available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/08-E-10.pdf. 
17 For references, see Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 15. 
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A.  The Clauses 
 
As noted earlier, the clauses we examine were at the center of reform 
debates relating to the New York-law market for sovereign bonds, through the 
period 1995-2003. This is the set of terms referred to as CACs. A sovereign bond is a 
multi-creditor contract. Typically, there will be hundreds of bondholders governed 
by a single bond issuance (which, today, is often in the billions of dollars or euros). 
Prior to 1990, for the most part, if the sovereign debtor needed to ask for debt relief, 
it needed to conclude a debt reduction agreement with each of the individual 
bondholders under the prevailing unanimity action clause or UAC. However, as the 
number of bondholders and their level of dispersion across the globe expanded–
which it did, with the expansion of the bond market and the shift away from 
syndicated loans–the coordination problem became increasingly difficult to solve 
under UACs. In particular, individual bondholders, despite their small holdings, 
were able to hold up any collective attempt to renegotiate the debt. This holdout 
problem worsened with the emergence of hedge funds that used their deep pockets 
to pay for high-quality litigators and to avoid liquidity problems that might cause 
small bondholders to settle. The proposed solution from policy and industry experts 
was for the contracts to be reformed to bind these holdouts to a restructuring, so 
long as some significant fraction of the creditors agreed to the reform. Hence the 
term “Collective Action Clause” or “CAC”.  
 
We examine the evolution of this CAC from the time when the dominant 
model in the market required unanimous consent for modification of terms, to the 
time at which the new dominant model required less than unanimous consent. 
  
A large literature on CACs already exists.18 Because much of the existing 
literature on CACs is from either economics or finance, the focus is on the economic 
impact on adopting CACs; that is, the impact on the cost of capital for sovereign 
debtors.19 By contrast, we are interested in how and why these clauses evolve. Much 
of the existing research assumes that these bonds meaningfully differ along only a 
single dimension: the vote that they require for the alteration of payment terms (by 
“payment”, we mean principal, interest, maturity and currency). Indeed, much of the 
                                                        
18 E.g., Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? 114 
ECON. J. 247 (2004); Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond 
Yields?, 6 INT’L FIN. 415 (2003); Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the 
Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis (2012 draft), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534.  
19 E.g., Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New 
Evidence from Emerging Markets (2003). www.rba.gov.au/rdp/rdp2003-02.pdf; Federico 
Weinschelbaum & Jose Wynne, Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets. 
67 J. INT’L ECON. 47 (2005).  
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research assumes that there are only two types of contract provisions, UACs 
(requiring unanimity to alter payment terms) and CACs (requiring a 75% vote to 
alter payment terms). An examination of the contracts, however, reveals that these 
CACs differ along a number of important dimensions other than the raw vote. 
 
Below, we describe five dimensions along which we measure these CAC 
provisions.  
 
i. Vote Requirement – Payment Term Modification: CACs vary in terms of the 
vote fraction required to modify payment terms. For each bond, we calculate 
the lowest vote required to alter payment terms. This calculation is made as a 
function of features in the contract such as quorum and adjourned meeting 
provisions. Some bonds, for example, allow for the required vote to be 
reduced at the adjourned meeting if a quorum is not satisfied at the initial 
bondholder meeting. For the bonds in our dataset, the vote requirements 
range from a high of 100% (unanimity) to a low of 18.75%.20 Because this is 
the most important dimension, we code the models in terms of all of their 
variations. The models, in New York and England have Min Mod Vote equal to 
either 1, .85, .75, .375, .25 or .1875.  
 
ii. Vote Requirement – Modification of Other Key Terms: While research on 
CACs has primarily focused on the vote required to alter payment terms, the 
ability to alter non-payment terms can also be important to sovereign issuers 
seeking to restructure their bonds. Crucial non-payment terms include the 
negative pledge clauses, cross default provisions, acceleration provisions and 
governing law clauses. A sovereign seeking to do a restructuring can use its 
ability to threaten the alteration of key non-payment terms, assuming it has 
enough creditor support, to incentivize a restructuring. Because the ability to 
alter non-payment terms is less important that the ability to alter payment 
terms, we consolidate the variation into three categories (high, medium and 
low). We do this in order to limit the number of moving parts in our analysis 
to fewer than a dozen different CAC models. Specifically, what we have in the 
data is that Other Vote is equal to either 1, . 37, .5, .67 and 0.75. For the sake 
of simplicity, and because there are relatively few bonds with Other Vote 
equal to .37 and .67, all of which show up in the same period (stage two) as 
the 0.5 value shows up, we fold those two into the 0.5 variable. That gives us 
                                                        
20 The 0.1875 vote requirement can be somewhat misleading in that it suggests a much lower vote 
requirement that operates in actuality. That vote requirement typically comes hand-in-hand with a 
requirement of a mandatory meeting with diminishing quora. What we calculate for this variable is 
the minimum vote required to alter payment terms (Min Mod Vote). For the bonds that we code as 
requiring 0.1875, the typical vote requirement at the first meeting is 75% of those present at the first 
meeting (in principal amount), so long as there is a 50% quorum. If that 75% quorum at the first 
meeting is not met, the quorum required for the next meeting reduces to 25%. That then translates 
into a minimum required vote of 75% of 25%, which is 18.75%. 
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variation between the old standard (1), the intermediate standard (0.37-
0.67) and the most recent standard (0.75).21 
 
iii. Disenfranchisement: If there is voting where a supermajority of voters can 
potentially outvote a minority holder and force her to suffer a haircut, the 
voters might want safeguards to make sure that the debtor is not able to 
manipulate the vote. However, this is not always the case. Some bondholders 
are willing to give the issuer wide leeway in terms of who gets to vote on the 
Modification CAC. Others, by contrast, restrict the voting to those 
bondholders who are not “owned or controlled” by the issuer. We code this 
variable, Disen, as taking two forms: 0 (no disenfranchisement provision) and 
1 (a restriction on the issuer voting bonds it “owns or controls”). There are a 
handful of additional variations in the data, such as whether Central Banks 
are allowed to vote. We do not consider those. 
 
iv. Mandatory Meetings: Some bonds require that any vote to decide on 
whether to activate a Modification CAC has to occur at a physical meeting of 
the bondholders. The requirement of a meeting typically has two effects, 
going in opposite directions: one, making it harder to restructure; the other, 
making it easier. On the one hand, a physical meeting of the holders allows 
them to coordinate; and that means that they might coordinate to block the 
intentions of the debtor. On the other hand, because meetings typically come 
with quorum requirements (and diminishing quorum requirements if the 
quorum is not satisfied at the first meeting), the actual vote required at a 
meeting is generally lower than that required in the absence of a meeting 
requirement. This lower vote requirement, in theory, makes bonds with a 
meeting requirement easier to apply Modification CACs to than those without 
one. We code the Mand Meet variable as coming in two types: 0 (no meeting 
required) and 1 (meeting required) 
 
v. Aggregation: The typical CAC operates within an individual bond. Any 
restructuring therefore has to be conducted bond by bond–a difficult and 
tedious exercise where a sovereign has hundreds of bonds outstanding, as 
can sometimes be the case. To solve this problem, some bonds use 
Aggregation clauses that operate as a function of an approval vote across all 
of the sovereign’s bonds (typically, a vote that is higher than the requirement 
in an individual bond). Because, there is only one type of Aggregation 
provision that was used up to 2011 (requiring an aggregated vote of 85% 
across the bonds, so long as individual bonds reach at least a 67% vote of the 
outstanding principal amount), we code the Agg variable as either 0 (no 
                                                        
21 The degree of variation in the Other Vote variable could be increased further, if we included the 
effects of diminishing quorum requirements in the English-law models. However, if we were to allow 
full variation in the Other Vote variable, we would have an unmanageable number of models, with 
much of the variation occurring on a variable of secondary importance as compared to the vote 
required to alter payment terms (Min Mod Vote).  
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aggregation across bonds; each bond has to vote and approve the change 
individually) or 1 (aggregation across bonds is allowed). 
 
We treat any particular combination of these five dimensions as our contract 
“model”. Our empirical tests focus on who introduces new models into the 
marketplace and when this introduction takes place. 
 
B. The Agents 
 
As part of our examination of the contract evolutionary model, a goal for us is 
to identify the key change agents, that is, the leaders in the innovation to 
standardization cycle. To be able to do this, we coded each bond for data for both 
the contract terms mentioned above and also for the identities of the key agents 
working on the deals. The agents include the issuer’s lawyers, the underwriter’s 
lawyers, and the lead investment bank. In terms of the counsel, we coded for the law 
firm in the legal jurisdiction of issue. That is, if the issue was under New York law, 
we coded for the New York based law firm that would presumably have had 
responsibility for crafting provisions that would work with the background New 
York law. Where the transaction in question was a restructuring, as opposed to a 
regular issuance, we also code that fact since the lawyers and bankers who tend to 
work on restructurings are often different from those who do offerings. There are 
other agents who are involved in these deals, such as the local counsel (e.g., the local 
counsel in South Africa on an issuance by the Republic of South Africa in New York, 
under New York law) and the secondary investment banks (that is the banks with 
smaller shares of the issue). Our understanding is that these actors play minimal 
roles in the contract drafting process. Hence, we did not collect data on their 
identities. Finally, since the lawyers and bankers on any deal are ultimately hired by 
the sovereign issuer, we code for the identities of the issuers as possible architects 
as change.  
 
Figures A1 through A6 in the Appendix depict the population distributions by 
total number of deals during our study’s 1990 to 2011 time period for issuers, 
issuer’s counsel, and underwriter’s counsel both for New York and English law 
governed bonds. The figures illustrate the dominance of a relatively few market 
participants for the New York and English-law sovereign bond markets. For 
example, in the New York law market, Cleary Gottlieb has more than 25% of the 
market on the issuer counsel’s side and Sullivan & Cromwell has more than 25% on 
the underwriter counsel’s side. We define high-volume intermediaries as those with 
more than 25% of the market. The graphs show that there are a handful of firms 
that dominate and then there are many others that only do a handful of deals each 
NYU Draft: 6/26/12 
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over a twenty-year period. For purpose of the analysis that follows, we break the 
data on potential change agents down into quartiles based on total number of deals 
they have done. We label the top quartile as “quartile 1” where we put the players 
who make up the top quarter of players and so on. 
 
The data on investment bankers does not show the same degree of skew as 
that on the lawyers. No single bank, in either the New York or English markets 
dominates the market. Reported in a different paper, the data show that there tends 
to be a great deal of variation in bankers in that the same issuer will frequently 
change its lead bankers from deal to deal (most likely because the deals are put to 
an auction).22 By contrast, the lawyers are long-term players. Further, while the 
bankers change, the lawyers for the bankers and the issuers appear to come in pairs 
– both having long-term relationships with the issuer. Consistent with the foregoing, 
the data also reveal that when one set of lawyers changes (e.g., on the issuer side), 
the other set (on the underwriter side) also typically changes.  
 
C. The Shocks 
 
We argued earlier that innovation occurs in response to external shocks that 
call into question the standard model or the boilerplate. The shocks that we use as 
the basis for our investigation are the shocks that were widely reported in the 
international press as having caused a rethinking of the existing terms in sovereign 
bonds. In our two-market system, we assume that shocks that directly impact one 
market will be felt with a reduced influence in the other market. So, a shock in one 
market that produces a change to the boilerplate, might be felt only with diminished 
impact in a second market. 
 
The three shocks we identify that hit during our period of study are: the 
Mexican “Tequila” crisis (which resulted in a bailout from the U.S.) (1995); the Asian 
financial crisis (which resulted in a number of IMF bailouts) (1997–98); and the 
Argentine default (IMF funding followed by a default) (2001).23 These were the 
shocks that produced calls for reform, particularly in terms of the need to put in 
place mechanisms so that there was not a constant need for bailouts. Effectively 
then, the time period we study has three sub periods. First, the pre-shock period of 
                                                        
22 Michael Bradley, Mitu Gulati & Irving De Lira Salvatierra, Lawyers as Reputational Intermediaries: 
Sovereign Bond Issuances (1820-2011) (April 2012; on file). 
23 For discussions of these crises, the bailouts, and the resulting push towards CACs, see Gelpern & 
Gulati, supra note 15; Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2003); 
JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN THE POST 
9/11 WORLD 119-131 (2007); John B. Taylor, Defining Systemic Risk Operationally, pp. 52-55, in 
ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM (KENNETH E. SCOTT ET AL., EDS. 2007). 
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calm of 1990–94 (stage one). Then there is the 1995–2002 period during which 
multiple large shocks hit the global sovereign debt markets (that is, the period of 
shocks; stage two). And then the post-shock period of 2002–11 (stage three). The 
three shocks mentioned all primarily hit the sovereign debt markets in New York–
the sovereigns in in question were primarily users of the New York market and the 
New York style boilerplate (Russia being an exception). Any impact of the shocks, 
therefore, should show up in a more marked fashion in the New York market.  
 
As of this writing, in June 2012, the sovereign markets have been hit by a 
new shock, the Eurozone crisis. This shock has led to fresh calls for standard 
sovereign bond contract terms to be revised. Specifically, the call for reform has 
been with respect to the CACs used on the European markets.24 Our data, however, 
only reaches up to the beginning of the Eurozone crisis.  
 
IV.  Evidence on Innovation in the New York Models 
 
Based on the five CAC-related dimensions described in the prior section, we 
find a total of ten different CAC models to have been in use during the 1990–2011 
period. In this section, we do two things. First, we examine the evolution of these 
different models over the periods of 1990–94 (pre-shock period of stability); 1995-
2001 (multi-shock and initial innovation period); and 2002–11 (post-shock and 
standardization period). We hypothesize that these three periods, as demarcated by 
shocks, correspond to the three stages of our innovation cycle analysis. Stage one is 
the pre-shock period of stability; stage two is the period during which marginal 
players commence innovations under the shadow cast by the dominant UAC 
standard; stage three is the post-shock and standardization period when dominant 
players commit to the new CAC-centered standard. For each stage, we document 
those models in use that continue from the past as well as new models that appear 
in the stage. Second, we unpack the data to identify the types of agents associated 
with new model innovation during the different stages. 
 
Our focus is on the timing of the introduction of new CAC models and the 
market participants associated with the innovation. We define a new model as the 
use of a new combination of the five CAC-related terms. Just like a bicycle model can 
vary from a prior model by changing one aspect of the bicycle, say the type of brake, 
we treat a particular contract as using a new model if any one of the five CAC-related 
terms change from any pre-existing model. For clarity, we give the models the name 
                                                        
24 Euro zone Deal Sees Collective Action Clauses from 2013-Elysee, REUTERS, November 28, 2010, 
available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/28/eurozone-crisis-france-idUSPISQME6ID20101128  
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of the nation that first began using it. Since some of the models in our first stage 
arise out of the prior era, we have had to utilize a supplemental dataset (for naming 
purposes only). Thomson One Banker, our primary source for the 1990–2011 
period, has relatively little data for the prior period, 1950–90. To examine the 
origins of the models during this period, we used data collected from the archives at 
the U.S. Library of Congress.25  
 
A. Stage One (Pre Shock Period of Stability) 
  
To assess the introduction of new models in stage one, we start with three 
models that were already in use prior to stage one: Belgian Congo 1958, Ireland 
1967 and Indonesia 1983. The Belgian Congo 1958 model is what one might call the 
full unanimity model, requiring 100% creditor approval to change either payment 
or non-payment terms. The Belgian Congo 1958 model dominated all through the 
1800s and the 1900-1980 period, which essentially had no CACs (Min Mod Vote = 1 
and Other Vote = 1).26 The Ireland 1967 model allows for some modification, 
requiring 100% approval for payment term changes, but relaxing that requirement 
for non-payment terms (to 50%). Finally, the Indonesian 1983 model is an early 
version of the modern CAC (the one that dominates the 2002–11 period). It allows 
for modification of both payment and non-payment terms with a less than 100% 
vote requirement (75% for payment terms; 50% for non-payment). All three of 
these models pre date our stage one; that is, the 1990–94 period in our dataset. No 
new models were introduced during stage one. Table 1 reports the different models 
that were in use in stage one.  
 
Table 1: New York Models in Stage One (1990–94) 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name Min Mod 
Vote - 
Other Vote Disenfranchisement Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation Market Share 
Belgian Congo 
1958 
1 1 0 0 0 17% 
Ireland  
1967 
1 0.5 0 0 0 80% 
Indonesia 
1983 
0.75 0.5 0 0 0 3% 
Note: 35 issues 
 
As suggested in Table 1, stage one is a period of calm. All three of the models 
in use during this period (1990–94) are carry overs from the prior period (Belgian 
Congo 1958; Ireland 1967; Indonesia 1983). One of those models is from three 
decades prior (Belgian Congo 1958) another is from two decades prior (Ireland 
1967). They are also all two-dimensional models. That is, only two of the five 
                                                        
25 Thanks to Mark Weidemaier, with his assistance with the Library of Congress data. 
26 See Weidemaier, supra note 13. We name it Belgian Congo 1958, because that is the first New York-
law bond that we have from the post-World War II period in our Library of Congress dataset.  
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dimensions we tabulate appear in the stage one models. We report the frequency of 
use of the models in stage one below.  
 
Among these three models, a single model dominates: Ireland 1967. For the 
35 sovereign bond issuances for which we have data for this period, the Ireland 
1967 model was used in 80% percent of the issuances. By contrast, the Belgian 
Congo 1958 model was used by roughly 17% percent and the Indonesia1983 model 
was used only in a single issuance (Indonesia’s own issuance in 1983). And 
Indonesia itself, by the end of the stage one period, had switched to the Ireland 1967 
model. Basically, there was no innovation or experimentation with CACs in stage 
one.  
 
B. Stage Two (Multi-Shock Period) 
 
 Stage two begins with a shock: the Mexican debt crisis in 1995, where the 
U.S. bailout resulted in widespread discussion of the need to reform the unanimity 
model that dominated the New York-law market in stage one.27 The subsequent 
financial crises in Asia (1997–98) and Argentina (2001) and resulting bailouts from 
the IMF were shocks that added to the concerns about the existing unanimity model 
and the need to move away from the bailout model. Table 2 reports on the CAC 
models in use in stage two. 
 
Table 2: New York Models in Stage Two 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name Min Mod 
Vote 
Other Vote Disenfranchisement Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation Market 
Share 
Belgian Congo 
1958 
1 1 0 0 0 6% 
Ireland  
1967 
1 0.5 0 0 0 86% 
Note: 137 issuances 
New Models 
Model Name Min Mod 
Vote 
Other Vote Disenfranchisement Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation Market 
Share 
Bosnia  
1997 
1 0.5 1 0 0 2% 
Qatar  
1999 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 1% 
Egypt  
2001 
0.85 0.5 0 0 0 1% 
Kazakhstan 
1997 
0.75 0.5 0 0 0 4% 
Note: 137 issuances 
 
 From Table 2, note that the pre-existing models continue to find use in stage 
two. Overall, there are many more issuances during this period (our dataset has 137 
bond issuances in stage two). The old Belgian Congo 1958 model, the anti-CAC 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS, WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN 
DEBTORS (1995). 
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model, is still used in the 1995–2001 period; albeit infrequently (being used by only 
8% of the issuances, down from 16% in the prior period). The Ireland 1967 model 
continues to dominate with roughly 86% of the uses (up from 80% in the prior 
period).  
 
Importantly, it is in stage two that we see the first new models since 1990 
emerge, indicating considerably more innovation than during the prior period. 
Three different sovereign issuers introduce new models: Bosnia 1997; Qatar 1999; 
and Egypt 2001. The Bosnian innovation is a relatively small one; it introduces a 
disenfranchisement clause that restricts the issuer from voting bonds it owns or 
controls. Qatar’s innovation is bigger. It borrows a model more commonly used in 
the English law market—with Min Mod Vote of 0.1875 and the requirement of a 
Mandatory Meeting. Egypt 2001, by contrast, uses a high Min Mod Vote of 0.85, with 
no meeting requirement. We treat one other model as a new introduction in stage 
two. Because the Indonesia 1983 model was abandoned by Indonesia itself in stage 
one, we treat Kazakhstan’s return to Indonesia 1983 model as an independent 
innovation (effectively, the Kazakh-Indonesia 1997 model). A few years later, 
Lebanon in 2000 adopts the Kazakh-Indonesia 1997 model.  
 
In sum, what we find during this period is that close to 94% of the issuances 
are under the two dominant models from the prior period, Belgian Congo 1957 
(close to 8%) and Ireland 1967 (around 86%). The other models—Bosnia 1997, 
Kazakhstan 1997, Qatar 1999 and Egypt 2001—only get a handful of adherents. But 
these marginal models experiment with CACs on multiple dimensions in addition to 
the two dimensions (Min Mod Vote and Other Vote) in use in the stage one models–
with new disenfranchisement and mandatory meetings clauses in addition to 
varying percentages for alterations to payment and non-payment terms.  
 
We next examine whether those market participants associated with the 
innovations in stage two are themselves marginal participants. We hypothesize that 
larger market participants will not shift away from the existing standard until it 
becomes clear that a shift to a new standard is clearly underway. In Table 3 below, 
we set out these new entrants in terms of who their lawyers and bankers are. In 
reporting the characteristics of these new entrants, we break down the lawyer, 
banker and issuer characteristics based on whether they are in the first, second, 
third or fourth quartiles in terms of the number of sovereign bond issuances for the 
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1990 to 2011 period. That is, if the issuer’s counsel for Kazakhstan is in the top 25% 
of issuers, by volume, it gets a rank of 1 in the issuer’s counsel box.28  
 
Table 3: Market Rank Associated with New Models in Stage Two 
Issuer Name Issuer Quartile 
Issuer Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Quartile 
Bosnia  
1997 
4 4 n.a. n.a. 
Kazakhstan 
1997 
4 4 4 1 
Qatar  
1999 
4 4 4 1 
Egypt  
2001 
4 4 4 1 
 n.a. = not available (in this case because Bosnia did a restructuring where typically only one set of lawyers is 
involved). 
 
Issuers like Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Qatar and Egypt were not big players in the 
sovereign debt  
 
C. Stage Three (Post-Shock Period) 
 
Stage three starts in 2002, after the Argentine default in late 2001. The 
Argentine default is significant because it is the last of the major shocks that occur 
for sovereigns that issued under New York law during the period of our study. We 
conjecture that the cumulative effect of the Mexican, Asian Financial, and Argentine 
shocks, as well as public sector responses to these shocks, led market participants to 
expect that a change would occur to the Ireland 1967 standard. After the Argentine 
default in late 2000, and increase in the decibel level of the complaints regarding the 
old contract models, it became gradually clear that there would be a new model. One 
of the key indicators here was the IMF’s proposal in 2002 of an alternative to CACs, 
a sovereign bankruptcy court (SDRM). Prior to that, the leading players in the 
market, such as the finance ministries of Mexico and Brazil, had been openly 
skeptical about CACs. However, the prospect of SDRM, along with the release of a G-
20 draft of proposed new clauses, and endorsement of CACs by the U.S. Treasury, 
created a sense that CACs would happen.29 But the question was, who would design 
the model that would be the new dominant design. 
 
                                                        
28 Quartiles could also be done in terms of the dollar (or euro) value of deals. Our results remain the 
same when we define quartiles based on total dollar value of deals during the time period of our 
dataset. The results also remain largely the same if we use breakdowns in terms of the top 10%, next 
10% and so on.  
29 This history is described in detail in Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 15.  
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While no additional shocks occur for New York-law governed bond issuances 
from 2002 to 2011 (hence we refer to this period as one of stability), the realization 
that a change in the boilerplate standard was to occur led to both a rapid change in 
the amount of contract innovation as well as the type of market participants 
involved in these changes. Table 4 reports on the types of pre-existing and new CAC 
models used in stage three. 
 
Table 4: New York Models in Stage Three (2002-2011) 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation Market 
Share 
Belgian Congo 
1958 
1 1 0 0 0 1% 
Ireland  
1967 
1 0.5 0 0 0 17% 
Bosnia  
1997 
1 0.5 1 0 0 3% 
Qatar  
1999 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 2% 
Note: 284 issuances 
New Models 
Model Name Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation Market 
Share 
Mexico  
2003 0.75 0.75 1 0 0 55% 
Brazil  
2003 
0.85 0.75 1 0 0 2% 
Turkey  
2003 
0.75 0.75 0 0 1 15% 
Uruguay  
2003 
0.75 0.75 1 0 1 5% 
Qatar  
2009 
0.1875 0.5 1 1 0 2% 
Note: 284 issuances 
  
We see four new models show up in 2003, in the early part of stage three: 
Mexico 2003; Brazil 2003, Uruguay 2003 and Turkey 2003. That means that almost 
half of all the new models we see over a 20-year period show up in a single year, 
2003 (this is a big year for new models in the English-law market as well, as we will 
see later). The fifth new model during this period is Qatar 2009 (which, as we will 
see, is qualitatively different from the others).30 
  
While the Ireland 1967 model still persists in stage three, it is far from being 
the dominant model. It drops from a market share of 86% to one of 17%. And the 
even older old Belgian Congo 1958 model drops from a 6% share to a 1% share (this 
                                                        
30 There also a Japan 2004 model that comes not from the sovereign itself, but from issuances by the 
Japanese Development Bank; a quasi sovereign. It is a slight variation on the Mexico 2003 model in 
that it lacks the disenfranchisement provision.  
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model had almost a 100% market share in the pre-World War II period). Instead, in 
2003, on the heels of the heated debate over the SDRM versus CACs (bankruptcy 
versus contract) in 2002, we see four new models show up: Mexico 2003; Brazil 
2003; Uruguay 2003, and Turkey 2003. And quickly, these models begin to 
dominate the scene. Two features of these four new models are interesting. First, 
they all show up during the same year, 2003. This is the point at which the dominant 
model shifts in the New York market as the Ireland 1967 model exits. Second, the 
models in stage three that appear in 2003 are from the high volume issuers and 
their high volume lawyers, unlike what we saw in stage two. These four models are, 
we surmise, the big players competing to be the authors of the new dominant 
design.31 Table 5 reports on the issuers and associated intermediaries that put 
forward new competing models in Stage three. 
 
Table 5: Market Rank Associated with New Models in Stage Three 
Issuer Name Issuer Quartile 
Issuer Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Quartile 
Mexico  
2003 
1 1 1 1 
Brazil  
2003 
1 1 1 1 
Turkey  
2003 
1 1 1 1 
Uruguay  
2003 
1 4 n.a. n.a. 
Qatar  
2009 
4 4 4 1 
 n.a. = not available (Uruguay 2003, was a restructuring where there is typically only one set of lawyers 
involved) 
 
Note from Table 5 that the four issuers that sought to compete over a new 
CAC standard in 2003 are all in the top quartile in terms of issuances. The attorney 
intermediaries associated with the four competing models in 2003 are also 
generally in the top quartile in terms of issuances. The issuer counsel and 
investment bank counsel for Mexico 2003, Brazil 2003, and Turkey 2003 are all in 
the top quartile. Not only are these players in the top quartile, they are the very top 
issuers and law firms, including Sullivan & Cromwell, Cleary Gottlieb and Arnold & 
Porter. The one exception among the 2003 models where we do not see a top issuer 
counsel is Uruguay 2003, where the issuer counsel is in the bottom quartile. 
Nonetheless, Uruguay would have received all first quartile scores if we had looked 
at any of its offerings other than its first one in 2003, which was a restructuring and 
                                                        
31 The view that the big players like Mexico introduced their innovations because they realized that 
change was inevitable and wanted to preempt other models from becoming market leaders is 
consistent with reports from market participants. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 15 at 1696-1700; 
see also NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 309 (n.25) & 313 (2004).  
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therefore had a special set of lawyers (restructuring lawyers) and had no 
investment banker counsel. Overall, the point is that unlike what we saw in stage 
two, the issuer, issuer counsel, and investment bank counsel associated with the 
new models that are introduced immediately after it becomes clear that a change in 
the standard will occur are the top market participants. The active participation of 
the top market participants is consistent with the view that these participants have 
a competitive stake in controlling the contract standard. Attorneys that control the 
standard have a competitive advantage in selling their services to future sovereigns 
seeking to issue under the prevailing market standard. As with the new models in 
stage two, the investment bank associated with the new models in stage three are 
not always in the top quartile, consistent with the view that the investment bank 
itself does not compete based on contract language but instead along other 
dimensions such as the underwriting discount. 
 
In sum, what we find in stage three is that the new models quickly take over. 
In our dataset of roughly 300 bonds for stage three (2002–11), over half of the 
sovereign bond issuances used the Mexico 2003 model of the CAC (55%). Ireland 
1967, the holdover model from the prior period, had 17% of the market still, 
followed by Turkey with 15% and Uruguay with 5%. In some ways, Mexico 2003, 
the model that won out, also had the most illustrious pedigree. Not only do its 
issuer’s counsel and investment bank counsel show up in quartile 1, but they are 
each the leaders within their quartiles (Cleary Gottlieb and Sullivan & Cromwell, 
being the top issuer and underwriter counsel, respectively). 
 
One other thing to note is regarding the Qatar 2009 model. While a new 
model in stage three, Qatar 2009 is notable in that the issuer, issuer counsel, 
investment bank counsel are all the bottom quartile in terms of issuances. 
Importantly, by 2009, the Mexico 2003 model was securely in place as the standard 
leaving little room for competition. The Qatar 2009 model was thus more akin to the 
innovations by marginal players that occurred in stage two than the models in 2003 
that the top market participants put into play to compete for the new standard. And 
if we look closely at Qatar 2009 versus the 2003 innovators, we see that the Qatar 
innovation was relatively minor (the addition of disenfranchisement to its 1999 
model), whereas the 2003 innovators (Mexico, Brazil, Turkey and Uruguay) were 
innovating along the most important dimension – the vote required to modify 
payment terms.  
 
That said, the new models of stage three, despite being from the big players, 
are all small variations on the innovations that showed up earlier in stage two. The 
shift from unanimity to something less (either 75% or 85% for Min Mod Vote) had 
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already been demonstrated to work by smaller players like Egypt 2001 (85%) and 
Kazakhstan 1997 (75%). In stage three, the Mexico 2003 and Brazil 2003 models 
used the same vote thresholds as Kazakhstan 1997 and Egypt 2001 had. In other 
words, the key dimension, the vote required to change payment terms, remained the 
same in the stage three new models. We conjecture that learning on how this key 
dimension played out in sovereign bond deals in stage two, including how they were 
priced, allowed stage three new models to incorporate these changes at low cost. 
What changed in stage three was the addition of ancillary terms, including 
Disenfranchisement provisions, higher vote thresholds for Other Vote, and 
Aggregation. It was like Steve Jobs of Apple Computer in the mid 1980s (an example 
of a top market participant) taking Xerox’s mouse (at the time a marginal innovation 
much like the CAC payment related term in the stage two new models of our 
analysis) and making it more acceptable to the wider market (with the addition of 
important ancillary terms). No one remembers Xerox’s mouse anymore. Job’s 
mouse, by contrast, is one of the dominant designs on the market.   
 
D. Summary of Results 
 
 We find that shifts in boilerplate contract terms do not occur without some 
initial shock. Absent a shock, boilerplate standards persist. During stage one, we 
report no new model innovations. Instead, all contracts use one of the three pre-
existing CAC models and most use the dominant Ireland 1967 standard. Shocks can 
in turn induce a change in the market standard. An initial shock (Mexico 1995), can 
spur marginal players in the market to commence experimentation, reducing but 
not eliminating the dominance of a pre-existing standard (corresponding with stage 
two of our model). Eventually, the cumulative effect of the crises in Mexico 1995, 
Asia in 1997–98, and Argentina in 2002 as well as public sector pressure produced a 
loud call for change to some CAC model in New York-law governed bonds. Once 
market participants expect a change in the contract standard, the bigger players join 
the competition to set the market standard and changes in market practices take 
place rapidly (stage three of our model).  
 
 Figure 1 below depicts the percentage market share of the two dominant 
New York Bond CAC standards in effect during the time period of our study: Ireland 
1967 and Mexico 2003. Note from Figure 1 that a rapid although not universal shift 
to the new Mexican model occurs after Mexico’s 2003 issuance.  
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 Importantly, the shift to the Mexico 2003 standard does not occur in 
isolation. Figure 2 reports on the market share of other competing models during 
our sample time period. 
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Figure 2 depicts the more marginal competing models prior to the Mexico 
2003 shift. During stage two of our analysis, we saw new models from Bosnia 1997, 
Qatar 1999, and Egypt 2001. Not only are these issuers in the bottom quartile in 
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term of issuances but the intermediaries most concerned about the contract 
language (the issuer counsel and the underwriter counsel) are also in the bottom 
quartile in terms of issuances.  
 
In contrast, once it becomes clear that a new standard is to emerge in the 
market, after for example the incidence of Ireland 1967 and Mexico 2003 cross in 
dominance (or at the X mark in the chart), the source of innovation in models 
changes. During stage three of our analysis, we see new models from Mexico 2003, 
Brazil 2003, Turkey 2003, and Uruguay 2003. As we report above, these issuers are 
not only in the top quartile in terms of issuances but the issuer counsel and 
underwriter counsel are generally in the top quartile as well. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that once a shift to a new standard becomes clear, 
the top market participants who compete based on the type of contract they offer 
will have a strong incentive to take an active role in generating this new standard. 
The resulting competition among top players results in (a) a delay in the eventual 
shift to a universal new standard and (b) a time period during which there are 
competing standards with more than negligible market share until the universal 
new standard becomes dominant. In terms of Figure 2, this dynamic leads to the S 
curve of adoption of the Mexico 2003 standard that we observe. This S curve pattern 
is a familiar one in the scholarship on innovation, but has not yet been explored in 
the contract innovation research.32 
 
V. Aftershocks: The Impact on English Law Bonds 
 
 The sovereign bond market today, and over the period we study (1990–
2011), is dominated by issuances out of two locations, New York and London.33 Over 
the years, the contract documentation practices in these two markets, under either 
New York or English law, have developed in different ways. The fact that sovereign 
issuers themselves, over long periods of time, have shown themselves unlikely to 
switch between the English law or New York law enables us to examine how and 
when contract provisions migrate back and forth, independent of movements by the 
issuers themselves.34  
 
In this section, we examine the data on English-law bonds. A key fact is that 
the shocks that we examine in this paper all primarily hit the New York market. 
Restructurings in the New York market, in the 1990s, were difficult to conduct 
                                                        
32 On the S curve in the innovation area, see, e.g., Vijay Mahajan et al., New Product Diffusion Models in 
Marketing, 54 J. MARKETING 1 (1990); Barbara Wejnert, Integrating Models of Diffusion: A Conceptual 
Framework, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 297 (2002).  
33 Bradley & Gulati, supra note 5. 
34 Id. (describing this aspect of the data). 
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because the vast majority of bonds contained unanimity requirements (UACs) to 
alter payment terms (Min Mod Vote = 1). The big change that took place in the New 
York market was the shift from UACs to CACs (Min Mod Vote = 0.75, typically). By 
contrast, the English market was already using CACs at the time the shocks in the 
New York market occurred. Indeed, innovators in the New York market were likely 
looking to the English market to borrow from the models that had had success 
there. One might expect therefore that there would be relatively little impact of the 
shocks in the New York market on English-law bonds. As we will see below, 
however, the English-law bonds, despite already containing CACs, did see 
innovation and experimentation in line with the New York market, albeit, with some 
significant differences.  
 
A. Stage One (Pre Shock) 
 
Table 6 provides English-law bond data on the models in stage one. What we 
see in stage one for the English-law data from 1990–94 is almost exactly the same as 
what we saw for New York. There are no new models in this period of calm. The 
only models in use in the English market are two old models (one from the 1960s 
and one from the 1970s). One of the old models, Austria 1964 is essentially the same 
as the Belgian Congo 1958 model we saw in New York. That is, there is no collective 
action (unanimity is required to alter both payment and non-payment terms). This 
is a holdover model from the Pre World War II period, where it had nearly 100% of 
the market. The model that dominates in the 1990–94 period though, is Sweden 
1977, which has a 96% market share. Sweden 1977 has a CAC, in that the payment 
terms can be modified with a vote that is less than unanimous (Min Mod Vote = 
0.1875; Other Vote = 0.5; Mand Meet = 1).  
 
Table 6: English Models in Stage One 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name 
Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran- 
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation 
Market 
Share 
Austria 
1964 
1 1 0 0 0 4% 
Sweden 
1977 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 96% 
Note: 56 issuances 
 
B. Stage Two (Multi Shock Period) 
 
 Stage two (1995–2001), is when the three shocks hit the New York market 
(the Mexican crisis, the Asian financial crisis and the Argentine default). Table 7 
reports the contract models employed in the English market in stage two. At first 
cut, what we see in stage two looks similar to what we saw in the New York market 
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during stage two. Recall that it was in stage two that we saw a number of marginal 
players innovating in the New York market, modifying their UACs into CACs. We see 
in stage two in the English market that even though there were CACs already, there 
is innovation. The innovation is however small, as compared to what was occurring 
in the New York market.  
 
It is in the New York market where innovations led to the primary 
restructuring variable, the vote required to alter payment terms (Min Mod Vote), 
changed from 100% (a UAC clause) to something less (a CAC clause)—a major 
change. It is important to note that when the New York market switched from UACs 
to CACs, the dominant model that it moved to was not the dominant English model 
(Sweden 1977, where Min Mod Vote was 0.1875). Instead, New York moved to a 
higher Min Mod Vote vote (Mexico 2003 had Min Mod Vote = 0.75 compared with 
the English market (Sweden 1977 had Min Mod Vote = 0.1875). The New York 
market also moved to higher votes for non-payment terms (Mexico 2003 had 0.75 
for Other Vote compared with Sweden 1977 that had 0.5 for Other Vote) and 
disenfranchisement was included. All of these were changes to the traditional 
English CAC model that advocates of CACs in New York had initially used as their 
basis for a New York CAC model (one New York issuer, Qatar, had in fact attempted 
to introduce the traditional English model).35  
 
In contrast, the innovations in the English market are not as major as the 
innovations in the New York market during stage two. As Table 7 shows, the three 
new models that show up in stage two in the English market all are changes in 
voting thresholds in existing CAC clauses without the addition of entirely new 
clauses. Denmark 1997 raises the Other Vote to 0.75 (from 0.5) whereas Greece 
1998 and Tunisia 1999 raise Min Mod Vote to 0.25 and 0.5 respectively (from 
0.1875). Similar to the experience in the New York market in stage two none of 
these new English models gets very much adoption in stage two (the market share 
in each case is very small – 1% each). If participants in the market closest to the 
shocks (New York) do not adopt a new standard, we expect that participants in the 
more distant market (English) likewise will also not shift to a new standard. The 
bulk of the English market share still goes to the traditional Sweden 1977 model. 
 
                                                        
35 For a discussion of the reasons for the move away from the English model of CACs in New York, see 
Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses, Bank of International Settlements (2002), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm  
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Table 7: English Models in Stage Two 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name 
Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation 
Market 
Share 
Sweden  
1977 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 91% 
Iceland  
1981 
0.1875 0.5 1 1 0 7% 
Note: 119 issuances 
New Models 
Model Name 
Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation 
Market 
Share 
Denmark  
1997 
0.1875 0.75 0 1 0 1% 
Greece  
1998 
0.25 0.5 0 1 0 1% 
Tunisia  
1999 
0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1% 
Note: 119 issuances  
  
 Unlike what we saw with the New York market stage two models, Table 8 
shows that the English market stage two models do not all come from marginal 
players. Greece and Denmark, two of the innovators in stage two, are big issuers. As 
for their counsel, they have some high volume law firms representing them such as 
Allen & Overy and Freshfields. In other words, unlike with New York, we do not find 
that innovation in the English market is dominated by the smallest (fourth quartile) 
market participants in stage two. This is inconsistent with our prediction that the 
marginal players—those seeking to take chances to raise their market share—will 
drive innovations in stage two. One possible explanation for this difference with the 
New York market is that the English market already was using CACs as the standard. 
At least some large market participants that already employed CACs may have 
viewed minor innovations around the CAC as part of maintaining the standard (and 
addressing the concerns of issuers in the midst of the shocks and change in the New 
York market) without threatening their dominant position due to their expertise 
with the existing CAC standard. 
 
Table 8: Market Rank Associated with New Models in Stage Two 
Issuer Name Issuer Quartile 
Issuer Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Quartile 
Denmark  
1997  
1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Greece  
1998 
1 1 4 1 
Tunisia  
1999 
n.a. 2 1 2 
 Note: 119 issuances; n.a. = not available because information was not reported on the prospectus. 
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 We move next to stage three. In the New York context, stage three was where 
it became clear that a new model was going to emerge. And the biggest players 
appeared to be competing over which of the models would emerge as the dominant 
one. Mexico 2003, emerged victorious, with a 55% share. No other model came 
close. What we see in the English-law data is different. Instead of a new model 
emerging as clearly dominant, we see a number of models competing across the 
2002-2011 time period in our study. But, as with the New York market, we do see 
eventual convergence to a standard in the English market, albeit at a slower pace 
than in the New York market.  
 
As Table 9 describes, five new models emerge in the 2002–11 period in the 
English market (Bahrain 2003, Morocco 2003, Hungary 2004, Finland 2004, and 
Ukraine 2007). The two 2003 models, Bahrain 2003 and Morocco 2003, are similar 
to the models that emerged in stage two, in that they both moving the voting 
threshold for existing CAC clauses, raising Min Mod Vote from 0.1875 (to 0.25 and 
0.375) and raising Other Vote slightly (from 0.5 to 0.75 in the Bahrain case). One 
year later, Hungary 2004 and Finland 2004 are the more major innovations in the 
English context. Finland 2004 does not add new contract dimensions but does raise 
the voting threshold on payment terms (Min Mod Vote) well above 0.5 to 0.75, 
matching the voting threshold in the New York law new models (in particular the 
Turkey 2003 model). Hungary 2004 not only raises Min Mod Vote to 0.75, the model 
adopts a new clause—Disenfranchisement (similar to Mexico 2003).  
 
In New York in stage three, readers will recall, Mexico 2003 quickly emerged 
dominant, with 55% of the market; Turkey 2003 was next with 17%. In the 
meantime, the previously dominant model in the New York market, Ireland 1967, 
dropped from an 86% market share to 17% from stage two to three. What we see in 
stage three in the England market is similar, albeit to a lesser degree. The Hungary 
2004 model (the equivalent of the Mexico 2003 model) quickly emerges as a leading 
model, with the biggest market share of 30%. Finland 2004 (the equivalent of 
Turkey 2003, in New York) has a 9% share. Together, these New York style CAC 
models emerge in stage three to take almost 40% of the English market in stage 
three. Sweden 1977, by contrast shows a sharp decline and slips from its over 90% 
share in stages one and two, to a 13% share in stage three. Denmark 1998, which is 
a cross between the traditional English model and the new dominant New York 
model, also emerges with a 28% share.  
 
Overall, we see that the old dominant model does get displaced in stage 
three, just as it did in New York. However, unlike with New York, where one new 
model was clearly dominant, there is no clear victor in the English market at least by 
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the end of 2011. We also see a feedback loop in operation. The New York CACs drew 
their inspiration from the English model, but sought to improve upon it. In turn, the 
English issuers drew from the improvements made to their model in New York and 
borrowed some of those in their models.  
 
Table 9: English Models in Stage Three 
Pre-Existing Models 
Model Name 
Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation 
Market 
Share 
Sweden  
1977 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 13% 
Iceland  
1981 
0.1875 0.5 1 1 0 4% 
Greece  
1998 
0.1875 0.5 0 1 0 2% 
Tunisia  
1999 
0.5 0.5 1 1 0 4% 
Denmark  
1998 
0.1875 0.75 1 1 0 28% 
Note: 177 issuances 
New Models 
Model Name 
Min Mod 
Vote 
Other 
Vote 
Disenfran-
chisement 
Mandatory 
Meeting 
Aggregation 
Market 
Share 
Bahrain  
2003  
0.25 0.75 0 1 0 9% 
Morocco  
2003 
0.375 0.5 0 1 0 2% 
Hungary  
2004 
0.75 0.75 1 0 0 30% 
Finland  
2004 
0.75 0.75 0 0 0 9% 
Ukraine 
2007 
0.25 0.75 1 1 0 2% 
Note: 177 issuances 
 
 In terms of the market position of the innovators, we see that stage three in 
the English market once again does not show the uniformity of the New York market 
where the new models of stage two came from marginal players and the new 
models of stage three came from dominant players. In the English market, both 
marginal and dominant players appear to be innovating in both stages two and 
three as Tables 8 and 10 suggest show actors from a range of quartiles producing 
new models. The market positions of the innovating parties, particularly the issuer 
counsel and investment bank counsel, do seem to increase toward the end of our 
stage-three time period. This may indicate that the expectation that the English 
market would move to a new standard arose later in the English law market 
compared with the New York market, consistent with the sovereign debt shocks 
affecting the English law market more distantly, at least initially, than the New York 
market.  
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Table 10: Market Position of New Models in Stage Three 
Issuer Name Issuer Quartile 
Issuer Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Counsel 
Quartile 
Investment 
Bank Quartile 
Bahrain  
2003 
4 4 3 2 
Morocco 
2003 
4 3 4 1 
Hungary  
2004 
2 n.a. 1 2 
Finland 
2004 
1 n.a. 1 2 
Ukraine 
2007 
4 2 1 1 
  
D. Summary 
 
 The evolutionary patterns in the English data show similarities to what we 
saw with New York, even though the shocks hit the English market in a dampened 
form. Most distinctly, we see the data on innovations fit a distinct three-stage 
pattern, with no innovation prior to the shocks (the period of calm), followed by a 
number of new models emerging in the wake of the shocks (the period of multiple 
shocks), and concluding with the displacement of the old dominant model and the 
emergence of new ones (the post shock period). What we do not see in the English 
data, however, are the distinct differences that we saw in stage two and three in 
New York between the identities of innovators in the two stages. In the New York 
market, marginal players innovated in stage two; large players competed to set the 
dominant design in stage three. In the English market, there is not such a clear 
division between stages two and three. Both marginal and large players innovate in 
those two periods of time and no clear dominant model has emerged, as of mid 
2011, where our dataset ended. One explanation for this difference is that the 
English market felt the sovereign debt shocks in the 1990s and early 2000s only 
distantly, and thus the recognition that a new standard would take hold in the 
English market occurred much later than in the New York market.  
 
 As of this writing, in June 2012 though, the equivalent of 2002 in the New 
York market appears to be taking place in the English-law market. The Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis hit the European markets hard in 2011. Greece restructured in 
March 2012, in the largest sovereign bond restructuring ever done. And the 
Eurozone’s Bonds and Bills Committee has issued a set of proposed new CACs for 
Eurozone sovereigns. These new Euro CACs, because they contain Aggregation 
provisions, are likely to be more effective than the ones enshrined in the Mexico 
2003 model that became the market standard in New York. The existing models in 
the English market, such as Hungary 2004 and Denmark 1997, we suspect, will 
wane in the wake of this new Euro CAC model that the big Eurozone nations are 
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pushing.36 We expect to see a transition a new dominant design show up starting in 
2013 in the English market much like Mexico 2003 became dominant in the New 
York market. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 In the business context, contracting parties generally do not draft contracts 
in a vacuum, arising newly formed for any particular deal. Instead, contracting 
parties rely heavily on boilerplate terms. The use of boilerplate is well known. And 
boilerplate can change if the benefits from using a new standard outweigh the costs 
(from network externalities, legal uncertainty and other sources). What is less 
understood is the process through which one boilerplate standard gives way to a 
new standard. If the benefits of using a new standard outweigh the costs of sticking 
with a boilerplate do we observe instantaneous shifts to new standards?  
 
 Our contribution is to demonstrate that new contract innovations in at least 
one important contracting context—the sovereign bond market—occur through a S 
pattern similar to what is found in product innovation. Prior to any shock, existing 
standards are sticky and innovation sparse (stage one of our model). External forces 
can precipitate a change in the standard, such as the shocks in the sovereign bond 
market we observe during the time period of our study. Rather than result in an 
immediate shift to a new standard, these shocks initially lead to a period of 
experimentation on the part of more marginal players (stage two of our model). Top 
players have a vested interest in supporting the existing standard through which 
they maintain their competitive dominance. Stage two represents the initial low 
positive slope portion of the S pattern for the introduction of a new standard. 
 
 Stage two continues until market participants come to the conclusion that a 
shift in the standard will occur (the X tipping point in our analysis). In the sovereign 
debt context, we conjecture that prior learning from contract innovation in stage 
two, the cumulative impact of shocks, and public sector pressure led to the tipping 
point when top market participants abandoned the old standard and began 
competition over the new standard. In other contexts, other combination of factors 
including pressure from the public sector (e.g., the IMF) and approval from key 
industry groups are likely critical in reaching such a tipping point for a contract 
term standard.  
 
                                                        
36 For details on the new Euro CACs, see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 5. 
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 Once market participants expect a shift in the standard, we enter stage three 
of our model. In stage three, top market participants switch from defenders of the 
existing status quo to promoters of their own individual visions of the coming new 
standard. Competing visions can then lead to multiple new standards in stage three 
with one competitor gaining market share to become the new standard (as is the 
case for the Mexico 2003 standard). The rapid gain in market share represents the 
high positive slope portion of the S pattern. There is a corresponding drop in the 
market share of the old standard (in our case the Ireland 1967 standard). Where the 
market share of the new standard and old standards cross, or the X point, we 
conjecture that the incentive to compete for a new standard is at a maximum. It is at 
this cross point in our dataset that we observe not only the Mexico 2003 but also the 
Brazil 2003, Uruguay 2003, and Turkey 2003 models introduced.  
 
We also observe that standards may vary across differing market segments. 
The English-law governed sovereign bonds historically had very different collective 
action terms compared with the New York-law governed bonds. When standards 
differ by market segments, innovations in one market, the New York-law market, 
can have an effect (although indirect), on innovations in another market, the 
English-law market. This effect nonetheless is muted. The shocks and resulting 
contract innovations in the New York-law market did spur innovation and 
experimentation in the English-law market. But opinion leaders in the English-law 
market did not call for a shift to a new CAC standard during the time period of our 
study. Looking forward, we expect that the recent Greece sovereign debt shock and 
the numerous public sector calls for reform will lead the English-law market and its 
top market participants to compete more vigorously to generate a new English-law 
CAC standard. 
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Appendix: Market Shares (by Number of Deals) of the Various Participants in Sovereign Bond Issuances  
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